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Message in a Bottle: Illusive Remedies in the Parish
Coastal Zone Lawsuits
“The coastal zone is affected by the coastal waters and the Seven
Seas. Like love, the coastal zone is a many splendored thing. Its
ecosystem is a splendid relationship between ocean and beach,
between marshlands–and uplands, and between man and his
environment.”1 – Senator Hollings, 1974
INTRODUCTION
The crystal blue waters of Malibu are transparent and magical. The
boggy wetlands of Louisiana are murky and disappearing. Both California
and Louisiana regulate activity along their coasts through a coastal zone
management program, evidence of the confluence among all coastal
states.2 At the outset, a federal initiative to incentivize state and local
protection of the nation’s valuable coasts drove the creation of statewide
coastal management programs. The marked differences between the
implementation of respective programs resulted in a more accountable
structure in California. In November 1991, the California Coastal
Commission sued Amir Tahmassebi, a California landowner, alleging that
he violated the California Coastal Act by failing to obtain a coastal
development permit required for certain activities on his Malibu property.3
The court held that the California Commission had the statutory authority
to bring the suit, and Mr. Tahmassebi was estopped from re-litigating his
claim that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over his property.4 In
its ruling, the trial court required the Commission to comply with certain
notice provisions prior to imposing penalties.5 The process in California
was straightforward: the local commission demanded that the property

Copyright 2017, by MARGARET VIATOR.
1. JOSH EAGLE & MEG CALDWELL, COASTAL LAW 362 (2011).
2. The California Coastal Commission has focused its restorative efforts on the
Malibu coastline for several years, and legislation in the state is ubiquitous. See Adam
Nagourney, Battle over Lagoon Cleanup Divides a Surfing Haven, N. Y. TIMES, May
25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/us/26malibu.html?mc ubz=3.
3. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Tahmassebi, 69 Cal. App. 4th 255, 257 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998). The California Commission brought suit under the Public Resources
Code, which gave the Commission the right to bring the action for injunctive and
declaratory relief as well as impose civil fines for violations of the permit
requirements of the Coastal Act. The appellate court did not question the authority
of the commission to bring the action.
4. Id. at 259.
5. Id. at 260.
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owner take action, and when the landowner failed to comply, the
Commission brought the dispute to the courts.6
Since 1980, Louisiana’s local parishes and designated state agencies
have issued coastal use permits (“CUP”) to persons conducting activities
throughout the coastal zone.7 There are many differences between Louisiana
and California’s methods of regulating and implementing permit guidelines
and imposing penalties for violations. Louisiana’s methods are exemplified
in the Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits. Substitute Mr. Tahmassebi’s land
pursuits for Chevron Oil Company’s drilling and dredging within the
Jefferson Parish Operational Area and exchange the California Coastal
Commission for the Jefferson Parish local permitting authority. The
Louisiana Coastal Zone Management Act, also known as the State and Local
Coastal Resources Management Act (“SLCRMA”), similar to the California
law, authorizes state and local authorities to seek injunctive and declaratory
relief against violators of CUPs.8 In contrast to the Tahmassebi case,
Louisiana, its local parishes, and the Department of Natural Resources have
historically chosen not to bring suit against violators of the CUP process
under SLCRMA.9 Without regulation to enforce violations, which may be
followed by lawsuits, there is a gap in enforcement in Louisiana.10 The
paradoxical reality is that Louisiana is likely the most in need of coastal zone
enforcement.11
6. Id.
7. William H. Forman, Jr., The Louisiana Coastal Resources Management
Act of 1978, 28 LA. B.J. 91 (1980).
8. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(D), (E) (2014).
9. Local municipalities’ suits against oil companies are not limited to the
area of environmental protection. Local municipalities have commonly brought
suit over gun control issues. Several states have passed laws explicitly eliminating
a cause of action for the local governments to bring suit against the gun industry.
See Elizabeth T. Crouse, Arming the Gun Industry: A Critique of Proposed
Legislation Shielding the Gun Industry from Liability, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1346,
1357 (2004). See also Andrew S. Jessen, Louisiana and the Coastal Zone
Management Act in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina: A Renewed Advocacy for a
More Aggressive Use of the Consistency Provision to Protect and Restore Coastal
Wetlands, 12 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 133, 151 (2006).
10. See infra, Part II.B.1.
11. Southern Louisiana’s coastal zone is most prone to subsidence, which
causes reduced sediment and sea level rise. See Michael D. Blum & Harry H.
Roberts, The Mississippi Delta Region: Past, Present, and Future, 40 ANN. REV.
OF EARTH & PLANETARY SCIENCES 655, 668 (2012). Considering the contiguous
United States, Louisiana comprises approximately 40% of the nation’s coastal
marshlands. See William Lindsey, Louisiana’s Coastal Zone, It’s All Special, But
Some Areas Deserve Legal Classification: Using Section 214.29 of Louisiana’s
SLCRMA to Designate Special Areas and Protect the Coastal Zone, 27 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 351, 352 (2014). A study concerning coastal wetlands loss in
Louisiana may be found at https://perma.cc/5GHP-VTJM.
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In 2013, Jefferson Parish filed suit against nine oil companies.12 The
Parish alleged that the oil companies had violated the conditions of their
CUPs and that the companies had failed to obtain additional CUPs when
required.13 Five other parishes also sued,14 but Jefferson Parish’s suit was
the first to be decided. In August 2016, the 24th Judicial District Court
dismissed Parish of Jefferson v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., et al. based on a
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but in November, the same
judge reversed his decision, allowing the suit to proceed.15 Although
SLCRMA explicitly grants the right for state and local governments to
enforce violations of the CUP program, the statute’s language is unclear
as to what point in the regulatory process such action should occur.16
Inevitably, the question still arises whether the state or local government
must turn to other administrative remedies listed in SLCRMA prior to
seeking a judicial remedy.17 Following Judge Enrisht’s reversal, the
Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied defendants’ application for
supervisory review.18 The supervisory writ defendants sought is currently
pending in the Louisiana Supreme Court.19 The lack of guidance in the
statute, exacerbated by the lack of litigation on the issue, dooms courts to
continually dismiss suits that result in real harm to Louisiana’s coast.20 The
goal of the Parish Coastal Zone (“Coastal Zone”) lawsuits is to hold the
defendant oil companies responsible for violations of the state and local
12. See Dawn Geske, Jefferson Parish Suits Against Gulf Oil, Gas Industries
Dismiss after Parish Fails to Correctly Review Permits, LOUISIANA RECORD,
Aug. 14, 2016, https://perma.cc/C998-CMBL.
13. Reasons for Judgment, Parish of Jefferson v. Atlantic Richfield Co. et al.,
No. 732-768 (La. Dist. Ct. 2016) [hereinafter Atlantic Richfield].
14. The parishes are Vermillion, Plaquemines, Cameron, St. Bernard, and
Lafourche. See also Update: Vermillion Parish Police Jury Vote Not to Support
Oil and Gas Lawsuit, KATC (Aug. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/8CUP-XB2P.
15. Laura Springer Brown & Kelly Becker, First Parish Coastal Zone
Lawsuit to Proceed to Decision Falls for Failure to Exhaust Administrative
Remedies, THE ENERGY LAW BLOG (Aug. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/5R9YAHQ9; Mark Schleifstein, Jefferson Lawsuit against 9 Oil Firms to go to Trial,
NOLA, Nov. 10, 2016, https://perma.cc/CP5A-VM8R [hereinafter Schleifstein,
Jefferson Lawsuit].
16. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36 (2014).
17. See Schleifstein, Jefferson Lawsuit, supra note 15.
18. LAURA S. BROWN & JENNIFER FERRATT, COASTAL EROSION LITIGATION
IN LOUISIANA 12 (2017), https://perma.cc/9CTD-CAZE.
19. Id.
20. In Jefferson Parish v. Atlantic Richfield et al., the Jefferson Parish district
court dismissed the case, granting the defendant’s exception for prematurity for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court listed some of the
administrative remedies that were available to the plaintiff but did not specify, other
than by referring to the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a jurisprudential
doctrine, why the remedies must come first. See Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic
Richfield, No. 732-768.

240

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. VI

coastal zone management (“CZM”) laws.21 In light of that purpose, the
plaintiffs in the Coastal Zone lawsuit requested damages from the
defendants, without taking those administrative steps that align with the
structure of SLCRMA and its goal of protecting the coast.22 The statute
and the administrative regulations should be strengthened in order to reflect
a more concise order: first identifying the harm, taking steps to stop it, and
then seeking a judicial remedy either through injunctions or penalties.23
This comment focuses in on the issues with SLCRMA and the
administrative regulations and the holes that they leave open–whether the
state and local parishes are required to take administrative steps prior to
filing suit and whether the parishes’ claims constitute actual harm based
on the definition of continuing and non-continuing uses. Part I will delve
into the federal and state Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”) and
describe the grounds upon which the current Coastal Zone lawsuits stand.
Part II examines the definitions of continuing and non-conforming uses
under the statute and whether those non-conforming uses constitute
enforceable harm. Part III will analyze whether, based on that harm, the
state and local parish governments were required to exhaust their
administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Part IV will provide revisions
of SLCRMA (La. R.S. 49:214.36) to mirror the nuances of zoning law and
other successful state coastal programs, which will lead to efficient and
streamlined enforcement of violations of CUPs. In the midst of Louisiana’s
murky waters, the overarching purpose of this comment is to determine
whether the Jefferson Parish and the other local governments’ cases are
worthy of judicial determination and will survive appeal.
I. STATE LAW AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
SLCRMA is grounded in both Louisiana’s legislative history and a
strong federal initiative. Unique in the national realm, the federal Coastal
Zone Management Act (“CZMA”) allowed for a significant amount of
state control over individual programs. The first step in passing the
Louisiana law was federal approval.24 Once passed, implementation could
21. See Plaintiff’s Petition for Damages, Parish of Jefferson v. Canlan Oil Co.
et. al, No. 732-771, at 14 (La. Dist. Ct. 2013) [hereinafter Canlan Oil].
22. Id. Further, the parish, in its petition, references the stated policy of the
coastal resource program which is to prevent adverse impacts to the coastal zone.
Plaintiff’s Petition for Damages, Canlan Oil, No. 732-771, at 12.
23. In Terrebonne Parish School Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., the Supreme
Court of Louisiana noted that the case presented a balancing between the need for
coastal restoration and the importance of adherence to the law as well as respect
for the contracting parties. 893 So. 2d 789, 791-92 (La. 2005).
24. EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 1.
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begin on a statewide level. The nuances of the permitting process, as well
as the enforcement provisions, are important features of the legislation that
play a significant role in the Coastal Zone Lawsuits.25 SLCRMA’s history,
its hallmark features, and its overarching role in the lawsuits bring forth
questions of the necessity of administrative involvement prior to bringing
suit over a CUP violation. Part A of Section I explores the steps Louisiana
took to get federal approval of its coastal management program, Part B
examines implementation of the program at the state and federal levels,
and Part C explains the recent developments with the parish coastal zone
lawsuits.
A. Seeking Federal Approval
Louisiana’s coastal management program began with the federal
initiative to regulate activities that occur within the coastal zones of all
states. The purpose of the federal CZMA was to increase protection of the
Nation’s coasts.26 CZMA established several programs that award grants,
which a coastal state would be able to utilize if they participated and
submitted program proposals.27 Prior to CZMA, several states were
already heading in the direction of organized CZM programs.28 From the
federal perspective, there are few requirements that all states must meet, and
the federal law gives the state significant discretion in forming and
implementing the program once it is approved.29 Specific language in
CZMA directs that there must be a continued consideration of the national
interest during the program’s implementation.30 Although states must
consider what is in their best interest, the focus must remain on the national
perspective.

25. See Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan
Oil, No. 732-771.
26. At the time, Congress considered the decline in the nation’s coastal resources
and diminishing water quality a serious problem. Jessen, supra note 9, at 133.
27. U.S. DEP’T OF COM. & LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT (1980) [hereinafter FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
STATEMENT] (Letter from David Treen to Secretary Philip Klutznick).
28. See EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 369. As of today, thirty-four
states have created their own statewide coastal programs. Lindsey, supra note 11,
at 359.
29. See EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 361.
30. See FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 27, at 118. The
national interest consists of virtually everything that the local and state coastal
management programs are supposed to protect, including facilities primarily used
for energy production and transmission as well as wetlands and endangered
species. Supra p. 120.
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CZMA requires states to submit a plan for development of a CZM
program, in order for the states to participate.31 The Secretaries of
Commerce and National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration must
jointly approve the program.32 Once approved, funds become available to
the state.33 Upon implementation of a state’s plan, the state may use the
consistency provision, which gives it some veto authority over federal
activities in the coastal zone.34 Due to the variation among state programs,
some CZM laws are more effective and active than others. All state CZM
programs must establish a sufficient mechanism for communication and
coordination between the management agency and local governments, as
well as other state agencies.35 The consistency provision requires that
coastal activities carried out or approved by the federal government
affecting the state’s coastal zone must comply with the state’s coastal laws
and policies.36 The requirements of intrastate efficiency, as well as
consistency between federal and state governments, should have resulted
in a nationwide map of coastal programs, which holds coastal users from
South Carolina to Hawaii accountable.
Like other states, Louisiana understood the importance of its coastal
zone prior to passage of the federal law. Even before the implementation of
Louisiana’s CZM program, the legislature had recognized the importance of
agencies in conservation and development of the coastal zone.37 Louisiana
enacted SLCRMA primarily in pursuit of federal grant awards, and
SLCRMA mirrored the federal law.38
31. See Jessen, supra note 9, at 135.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 367.
36. Linda Krop, Defending State’s Rights Under the Coastal Zone Management
Act–State of California v. Norton, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L.& POL’Y 54, 55 (2007).
37. As early as 1971, the Louisiana legislature included in its Acts legislative
support for the Louisiana Advisory Commission on Coastal and Marine
Resources. One of the purposes of the commission was to assist the governor in
the development of the Louisiana Coastal Zone Management Plan and to do so,
the commission was authorized to work directly with state agencies and other state
departments. See H.B. 118, 1971 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 1971).
38. “Primary source of federal wetlands regulations is Section 404 of the
Federal Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 42 USC sect. 1344. Under CWA sec. 404 (a),
42 USC sec. 1344(a), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has primary authority
for issuance of fill and dredge permits.” See SCOTT A. BICKFORD & WILLIAM F.
RIDLON II, Key Issues in Wetlands Regulation in Louisiana, in OVERVIEW OF
WETLANDS REGULATION 7 (1994). Act 361’s definition of the coastal zone
paralleled the definition in the federal CZMA guidelines. The Act defines the
coastal zone as “all islands, beaches, salt marshes, wetlands and areas necessary
to control uses which have a direct and significant impact on coastal waters.” See
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 27.
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Independent of state regulation, the Army Corps of Engineers also has
the power to issue 404 permits, which are different than CUP permits, for
those activities that affect wetlands and navigable waters.39 The Clean
Water Act (“CWA”) delegates authority to issue 404 permits to the Corps,
but ultimately, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) retains final
authority.40 Statutory law and the Administrative Code provisions provide
that certain activities do not require permits under the 404 scheme.41 Prior
to its implementation, the coastal use permitting process in Louisiana
relied heavily on the existing 404 permitting process, creating overlap
between the state and federal programs.
The path to approval for SLCRMA was rough. Initially, federal
authorities completely rejected Act 705, the Louisiana legislature’s first
proposal for the statewide program.42 Early legislative debate surrounding
the final version of the Act focused on defining the Louisiana coastal zone
and determining the relative roles of the state and local governments in
implementing the program–an issue that continues to plague the wetlands
today.43 After amendments and federal approval, on July 10, 1978,
Governor Edwin Edwards signed Act 361, and SLCRMA became law.44
The statute established the Coastal Commission, which is composed of
twenty-three members, eleven of which represent the parishes in the coastal
zone. The governor appoints the remaining members of the Commission
from interest groups and the Department of Natural Wildlife and Fisheries.45
The Coastal Commission’s purpose is to serve as an appeals body for issues
39. See Julie D. Livaudais, Conflicting Interests in Southern Louisiana’s
Wetlands: Private Developers Versus Conservationists, and the State and Federal
Regulatory Roles, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1006, 1012-13 (1982). In contrast to OCM
management, the Corps of Engineers is continuously monitored, particularly by
citizen groups, for abidance to the 404 permitting. A citizen suit provision exists
within the act where individuals and environmental groups may participate in
permit decisions and challenge permit decisions. See supra pp. 1014-15.
40. Margaret Strand & Lowell M. Rothschild, What Wetlands are Regulated?
Juridiction of the §404 Program, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10372, 10373 (2010).
41. For example, LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(B)(7)(a) (2017), which
governs agricultural, forestry, and aquacultural activities, exempts activities that
do not require a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer and meet the
federal requirements for such activities.
42. The State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978,
LOUISIANA COASTAL LAW 1978, at 1, https://perma.cc /YY4Z-PW5L [hereinafter
LA. COASTAL LAW]. Part of the reason for the rejection was the definition of the
boundary that was included in the coastal zone.
43. U.S. DEP’T OF C OM . & LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, LOUISIANA
COASTAL RESOURCES PROGRAM–FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 23 (1980) [hereinafter LA. ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT].
44. See LA. COASTAL LAW, supra note 42.
45. Id. at 2.
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concerning CUPs.46 However, the Coastal Commission has not been widely
utilized as an appellate body within coastal zone regulation.47 SLCRMA
created a new administrative body for Louisiana, rooted in the Coastal
Commission, but the Commission does not play as significant a role as
anticipated by the original Act.
B. Implementation of the State and Local Coastal Resources
Management Act
In creating the CZM authority, Louisiana had to determine which
agency and governing body would head the task of issuing permits and
regulating those users that received permits. The result was a mutual state
and local initiative through which local parishes can issue permits for
activities that occur within their designated operational area. In the Parish
Coastal Zone lawsuits, both the state and local parishes have asserted their
interests, illustrating the tension in the statute. In focusing on implementation,
SLCRMA narrows in on uses of state and local concern.
1. Regulating Uses of State Concern
SLCRMA’s objectives are illustrated through broad statements of
public policy.48 SLCRMA lists twelve goals to be achieved through the
Coastal Use Guidelines,49 one of which is to create a separate management
authority at the state level for regulating coastal uses.50 Originally, primary
administration of the Act was under the authority of the Department of
Transportation and Development, but SLCRMA specified that the governor
could order that administrative functions be transferred to the Department
of Natural Resources (“DNR”) or the Department of Natural Wildlife and
Fisheries.51 This transfer of authority created the Office of Coastal
Management (“OCM”), which is currently the administrative body at the
state level responsible for issuing CUPs.52

46. Id.
47. See WILLIAM L. WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION § 13:14 (2013).
See also LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I § 723 (2017).
48. See LA. COASTAL LAW, supra note 42, at 2.
49. Act 361 lays these goals out in Section 213.8. LA. ENVIRONMENTAL
STATEMENT, supra note 43, at 44-45.
50. See FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 27, at 3.
51. See LA. COASTAL LAW, supra note 42, at 2.
52. Id. See also Applying for a Coastal Use Permit, LA. DEP’T OF NAT.
RESOURCES, https://perma.cc/5FCQ-6WRK (last visited Aug. 28, 2017)
[hereinafter Applying for a CUP].
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SLCRMA regulates activities as uses in the coastal zone and
determines whether those uses are of state or local concern.53 The
determination of whether an activity is of state or local concern remains
with the local governments but must be in accordance with certain
criteria.54 The definition of “use” under SLCRMA is any activity that has
a direct and significant impact on coastal waters.55 In determining which
uses are prohibited, the legislature intended to target the most common
alterations of wetlands.56 Any person is able to submit a request to DNR
for a formal determination as to whether a proposed activity will require a
permit.57 Further, OCM, during its review of coastal use permits, works
with the permit applicant to minimize the impact to coastal habitats or to
ensure that they are avoided.58 In order to receive a permit, a prospective
permittee first submits an application to either OCM or a local government
with an approved program.59 Once received, OCM must give public notice
of the permit application and distribute copies to the local government in
whose jurisdiction the use is going to occur.60 Within thirty days of the
issuance of public notice or within fifteen days after a public hearing, the
permitting body must decide whether to approve or deny the permit. Once
decided, the applicant, or any other aggrieved party, such as the local
government or an affected local, state, or federal agency, has thirty days
to appeal the decision to the Coastal Commission.61 The procedure for
application and issuance of coastal use permits at the state and local level
is clear, eliminating the possibility that the oil companies are not aware of
the guidelines and pointing to a gap in enforcement.

53. In a recent compilation of wetlands litigation on the Coastal Zone
Management Act in Louisiana, the reporter lists some cases that concern SLCRMA.
See also WANT, supra note 47.
54. LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(F)(1)(a) (2017).
55. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.23(13) (2000) defines use as “any use or activity
within the coastal zone which has a direct and significant impact on coastal
waters.”
56. These listed activities include draining, dredging, and filling of wetlands,
modification of the hydrologic regime, highway construction, mining and mineral
extraction, as well as water pollution. See BICKFORD & RIDLON II, supra note 38,
at 5.
57. See WANT, supra note 47.
58. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, A COASTAL USER’S GUIDE TO THE
LOUISIANA COASTAL RESOURCES PROGRAM II-3 (2015).
59. See LA. COASTAL LAW, supra note 42, at 4.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 5.
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2. Regulating Uses of Local Concern
Local governments may adopt their own coastal management
programs, which are responsible for issuing permits. Today, Louisiana’s
coastal zone encompasses twenty parishes.62 Ten Louisiana parishes have
implemented approved coastal management programs.63 If the activity is
within the parish’s sphere of authority, then the parish program’s approval
is sufficient, and the state does not have to approve the permit.64
A local government with an approved program may issue a CUP for
uses of local concern conducted within its coastal zone.65 In general, areas
of local concern are more isolated than those of state concern.66 A
prospective permittee may submit an application for uses that are of local
concern within an area with an approved local program, and the local
permitting body has the right to make the initial determination of whether
or not the permit should be granted.67 Uses of local concern include dredge
and fill projects that do not intersect more than one body of water, thus,
remaining local in scope.68 The Administrative Code lays out guidelines
for determining when a use is either one of state or local concern.69 Further,
the Code gives deference to local uses. When there is an overlapping use,
raising proportionate state and local concerns, then the use should be
62. In 2012, the Louisiana legislature passed House Bill 656 (Act 588) which
modified the boundaries of the coastal zone. The zone still includes twenty coastal
zone parishes. See Coastal Zone Boundary, DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES,
https://perma.cc/M5RC-XL7M (last visited Aug. 28, 2017).
63. Those parishes include: Cameron, Calcasieu, Jefferson, Orleans,
Lafourche, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. James, St. Tammy, and Terrebonne. See
WANT, supra note 47.
64. Local Government Participation in the Coastal Zone Management
Program, LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, https://perma.cc/9DAP-LBDL (last
visited Aug. 28, 2017).
65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:214.30(A)(1) (2010); see also Parish of
Plaquemines v. Total Petrochemical & Refining USA, Inc. et al, 64 F. Supp. 3d
872, 878 (E.D. La. 2014).
66. See Jessen, supra note 9, at 141.
67. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.30(C)(1) (2010).
68. See Livaudais, supra note 39, at 1033.
69. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723 (2017). Besides those uses that are
classified as state or local in SLCRMA, the permitting agency must consider the
following factors in determining the classification of a use: the relationship of the
proposed use to a particular use classified in the Act, and if there is an overlap
between that of state and local concern, then there should be a deference to a local
concern unless the act is carried out with state funds, involves the use of or has
significant impacts on state or federal lands, is mineral or energy development,
affects Louisiana’s offshore jurisdiction, will have major effects on water flow,
or has significant interparish or interstate impacts. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I,
§ 723(F)(3) (2017).
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classified as a use of local concern.70 DNR may review and reverse a
decision of a local coastal program.71
C. A Trilogy Continued: Third Lawsuit by a Public Entity Against Oil
Companies
The series of suits filed by the coastal parishes against the oil companies
follows suits non-private individuals have brought in recent years against oil
companies for activities conducted in the coastal zone.72 These suits have
not reached resolution, and Louisiana citizens are still looking for guidance
on how, and if, oil companies will be held responsible for damage to the
coastal zone.73 The Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits are unique because the
plaintiffs cited SLCRMA as the cause of action for the oil companies’
violations.74 Due to the multiplicity of filings in the Parish Coastal Zone
Lawsuits, this comment will focus on Jefferson Parish’s petitions, in order
to highlight the parish’s claims and to focus on the inquiry of whether
Jefferson Parish’s suit is worthy of judicial determination.
In Jefferson Parish’s complaint for the Barataria region, the Parish
alleged that the oil companies had violated SLCRMA and, thereby, caused
damage to land and water bodies located in the Coastal Zone.75 Specifically,
the petition alleged that the oil companies had drilled for oil in violation of
CZM laws and that they had carried out activities without the required
CUP.76 Those activities included use of waste pits, discharge or disposal
70. LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723 (2017).
71. Id.
72. In recent years, the board of commissioners for the Southeast Louisiana
Flood Protection Authority-East filed suit against one hundred oil, gas, and
pipeline companies. See Taylor Boudreaux, Legislatively Capping an Energy
Lawsuit: Problems Posed by Stripping a Pending Suit Against Ninety-Seven Oil
and Gas Companies, 76 LA. L. REV. 959, 961 (2016); see also Bob Marshall,
Levee Board Argues in Federal Court for Revival of Landmark Lawsuit, THE
LENS (Feb. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/Z6CT-X4DY. Terrebonne Parish School
Board filed suit against oil companies for activities conducted in the wetlands
pursuant to a mineral lease. See Ryan M. Seidemann, Louisiana Wetlands and
Water Law: Recent Jurisprudence and Post Katrina and Rita Imperatives, 51 LOY.
L. REV. 861, 866 (2005); see also Terrebonne Parish School Bd., 893 So. 2d 789.
73. See Mark Schleifstein, Jefferson, Plaquemines Parishes File Wetland
Damage Lawsuits against Dozens of Oil, Gas and Pipeline Companies, NOLA,
Apr. 27, 2017, https://perma.cc/D7WH-Z38V. Bobby Jindal, as well as the
Louisiana legislature, fought vehemently against that suit, eventually instituting
Act 544 into law. The thrust behind Act 544 was that the levee board was the
improper body to file the lawsuit. See Boudreaux, supra note 72, at 962.
74. Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan Oil,
No. 732-771, at 2-3.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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of oil field waste, and exceeding the permitted uses of the issued coastal
use permits.77 In answering one of Jefferson Parish’s petitions, the
defendant oil companies raised three dilatory exceptions: vagueness and/or
ambiguity, improper cumulation and improper joinder, and prematurity for
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.78 On August 1, 2016, the 24th
Judicial District Court issued judgment on the defendants’ third exception
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, finding that the lawsuit was
premature, and proceeded to dismiss the case without prejudice.79 Since then,
the state, under the guidance of Governor John Bel Edwards, has declared that
it will intervene in the lawsuit.80 The future timeline of the Parish Coastal
Zone Lawsuits depends on the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision on
whether to grant a writ of certiorari to the oil companies. A determination by
the Supreme Court should clarify the meaning of continuing and noncontinuing uses and whether exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
necessary step.
II. CONTINUING AND NON-CONTINUING USES AS HARMS
For those uses that are permitted in the coastal zone, there is a difference
between continuing and non-continuing uses. Especially for coastal
management, those uses that began lawfully prior to the implementation of
the CUP process may be exempt from abiding by regulations within
SLCRMA. This is the concept of “grandfathered” uses that are not treated
uniformly throughout the coastal management law.81 If the oil companies’
violations occurred one-time, prior to the implementation of the CUP process,
then they may not be held accountable. Further, issues of prescription arise
where activities are no longer ongoing and are no longer contributing to
harm. This issue weaves into the broader problem of a lack of guidance in
the statute for whether uses that are non-conforming must be regulated
according to certain administrative steps.

77. Id. at 8-12.
78. State of Louisiana’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s
Exceptions to the State of Louisiana’s Petition for Intervention, Atlantic Richfield,
No. 732-768.
79. Id.
80. Jeff Adelson, Governor Edwards Instructs Administration to Intervene in
Parish Coastal Suits Against Oil and Gas Companies, THE ADVOCATE, Apr. 11,
2016, https://perma.cc/RL66-ZNH6.
81. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(D) (2014).

2017]

COMMENT

249

A. Conforming Through Acquiescence: Substituting a Non-Conforming
Use
Although CZM laws provide strict guidelines for what may or may not
occur within the coastal zone, there is a possibility that a use that is not in
accordance with the guidelines may become accepted either through a
statutory exception or governmental acquiescence. For those users that have
obtained a coastal use permit, the user must abide by the terms and
conditions of that permit.82 As an exception, the Administrative Code, in its
general provisions, defines in-lieu permits, meaning activities which usually
require a CUP do not require one.83 The second exception is a grandfathered
use: a user lawfully commenced the activities prior to the implementation
of the CUP process and does not require a CUP.84 This provision creates a
category of uses, which may have been prohibited after the CUP process
was in effect and yet did not require CUPs. Based on these exceptions, a
coastal user must seek review through administrative processes prior to
commencing any coastal activity to either determine whether that activity
is lawful under the provisions or whether the use would be subject to
regulation by another division. Because of the overarching national
interest, the federal government must certify that the proposed activity will
be conducted in a manner that is consistent with SLCRMA.85 Either of
these designations would require administrative action to ensure that the
uses are conforming within the exceptions. By implicitly requiring an
administrative step, the law as it applies to conforming and non-conforming
uses hints that certain steps must be taken prior to seeking judicial remedy.
There is a gap in the requirements for the uses that fall under a
statutory exception but continued to occur through the beginning of the
implementation of the CUP process. SLCRMA and the Administrative
Code do not provide a definition for those activities that existed prior to
the implementation of the CUP process and continued to occur.86 Read in
tandem with SLCRMA, the Administrative Code distinguishes between
82. Id.
83. “Coastal use permits shall not be required for the location, drilling,
exploration and production of oil, gas, sulpher and other minerals subject to
regulation by the Office of Conservation of the Department of Natural Resources
as of January 1, 1979.” LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(A)(3) (2017).
84. LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(B)(8)(a) (2017).
85. In a CUP issued to Florida Exploration Co. in the Jefferson Parish
operational area, the permittee also submitted an application to the Army Corps
of Engineers, certifying that the proposed activity was within the guidelines of the
Louisiana Coastal Management program. See LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES,
Coastal Use Permit 821271 (issued Oct. 15, 1982).
86. These permits are often referenced to as in-lieu or “grandfathered”
permits although that specific language does not exist in the statute.
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continuing and non-continuing uses for coastal use permit purposes.87
Continuing uses are uninterrupted, whereas non-continuing uses are
conducted on a one-time basis.88 In order for a person’s activities to be a
prohibited use, as one that required a permit, it must be first identified as
such.
Jefferson Parish’s original petition included a comprehensive list of all
CUPs that had been issued within the parish’s Operational Area since the
inception of SLCRMA.89 Some of the flagged permits originated fifty to
sixty years ago.90 One of the violating permittees, Chevron Oil Company,
applied for a CUP to dredge certain canals in 1983, five years after the
implementation of SLCRMA and three years following implementation of
the permitting process. By 1984, the follow-up investigation for Chevron’s
permit indicated that the project had been terminated and that the permittee
had met all of the permit conditions.91 The investigating body was still
concerned about some aspects of the application.92 The coastal resource
analyst assigned to the project requested a field investigation of Chevron’s
site, prompted by Chevron’s potential for disruptive work in the canal
system.93 Despite the company’s proposed use or activity, local authorities
still signed off on the project as terminating successfully.94 Chevron’s
activities are a non-continuing use since the activity was conducted and
completed on a one-time basis. However, there must be a rationale for why
Chevron’s permit was included in Jefferson Parish’s petition. The petition

87. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723 (2017). Both continuing and
noncontinuing uses are permitted uses under the Administrative Code.
88. “Continuing uses are activities which by nature are carried out on an
uninterrupted basis, examples include shell dredging and surface mining
activities, projects involving maintenance dredging of existing waterways, and
maintenance and repair of existing levees;” “Noncontinuing uses are activities
which by nature are done on a one-time basis, examples include dredging access
canals for oil and gas well drilling, implementing an approved land use alteration
plan, and constructing new port or marina facilities.” LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt.
I, § 723(C)(9)(c)(i)-(ii) (2017).
89. See Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan
Oil, No. 732-771, at 9.
90. Geske, supra note 12.
91. See LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RESOURCES, Coastal Use Permit 19831461 (issued
Sept. 3, 2009).
92. The investigation cited occurred on August 7, 1984. The investigation
report listed Steven Chustz as the Coastal Resource Analyst and Rocky Hinds as
the investigator on Chevron’s project. See id. Most permits issued after 1978 may
be found in the Department of Natural Resources database.
93. See Coastal Use Permit 821271, supra note 85.
94. See Coastal Use Permit 19831461, supra note 91. Most permits issued
after 1978 may be found in the Department of Natural Resources database.
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does not isolate the specific permits that were allegedly in violation of the
coastal management laws. 95
The categorization of “use” under SLCRMA does not contain a definition
of a “new use,” yet Jefferson Parish included this term in its petition.96 The
petition addresses the existence of a waste pit, alleging that the pit was
caused by the actions of the defendant oil companies but conceding that
the companies’ actions may have begun prior to the passage of SLCRMA.
The petition further claims that the continued existence of the waste pit
constituted a “new use” for which the user must get another permit.97
Jefferson Parish’s characterization of the continued existence as a “new use”
is misleading. Under the coastal management laws, there is no process by
which an existing use can transform into a new use. By the Parish alleging
the new use in such a way, the permitting body can shy away from any
responsibility for monitoring the activities of coastal users.
B. Potential for Prescription of Claims
Regardless of the determination of whether a “harm” has occurred, a
person who is claiming harm must bring that claim within a certain period
of time. Under SLCRMA, claims of CUP violations do not have a clear
prescriptive period.98 If the plaintiffs in the Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits
are seeking damages, instead of restorative efforts or injunctions, then the
rule of prescription should be even more narrowly construed. Due to the
lack of case law on SLCRMA, there is no guidance on the issue of when
prescription and the duty to abide by governmental regulations collide.
The prescriptive period for violations of the duty to restore may also
provide a blueprint for longstanding CUP claims.
1. Nonconforming Grandfathered Claims
Nonconforming uses that were grandfathered in, as if they were
permitted, may still cause harm to the coastal zone and would be a potential
source of damages for a plaintiff. In its petition, Jefferson Parish contends
95. See generally Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone,
Canlan Oil, No. 732-771, at 9.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Prescription is a civil law term that designates a period of time after which
a substantive right is extinguished. The common law equivalent is statute of
limitations. See Wm. Grayson Lambert, Focusing on Fulfilling the Goals:
Rethinking How Choice-Of-Law Regimes Approach Statute of Limitations, 65
SYRACUSE L. REV. 491, 526 n.189 (2015). Because this comment primarily
focuses on Louisiana law, prescription will be used instead of the common law
term. However, the terms are practically synonymous.
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that, even if the defendants’ activities occurred prior to the implementation
of the CUP process, the company’s activities were unlawful under
different statewide orders.99 These statewide orders govern permits for
drilling of oil wells and the existence of pits.100 However, when a party is
conducting uses in the coastal zone in an unlawful manner, the issue of
prescription of those claims arises.
Prescription is interrupted when the cause of action is not known nor
reasonably knowable by the plaintiff.101 In considering the granting of a
contra non valentem exception, the court will deem the plaintiff to know
the information he could find out through reasonable diligence.102 In
Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp, a case concerning dredging of canals which
was based in a breach of contract for a mineral lease, the Louisiana
Supreme Court found that the claims for damage caused to a landowner’s
property were subject to a one-year prescriptive period.103 Although
Jefferson Parish’s claims, along with the other parishes in the Coastal Zone
Lawsuits, are based in a statutory violation, the parishes are alleging that
the defendants have caused damage to the coastal zone by failing to adhere
to the coastal use guidelines and the conditions within their coastal use
permit.104 Jefferson Parish’s specific request for relief in damages supports
an underlying tort theory. For example, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendants violated SLCRMA through the construction and use of unlined
earthen waste pits.105 This is a prohibited use under the statute, but the
plaintiff’s petition does not allege when the waste pit came into existence,
merely stating that no matter the date, its existence would be considered
illegal.106 Without an applicable prescriptive period of claims for violation
of CUPS, the harm must be ongoing, and it is unclear that the plaintiffs
have alleged the continuing harm sufficiently in their complaint.
99. See Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan
Oil, No. 732-771, at 14. The petition states that the activities were illegal under
Statewide Orders 29, 29-A, and 29-B, as well as various field wide orders and
orders of the Louisiana Stream Commission.
100. See id. (Statewide Order 29-B).
101. Id. This is known as the doctrine of contra non valentem, a discovery rule,
which should only be applied in extreme circumstances.
102. See Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234, 246 (La. 2010). The
contra non valentem doctrine is unique to Louisiana. The doctrine is juridically
created and prevents the running of prescription against those who are not able to
bring suit. See HON. MAX TOBIAS ET AL., LOUISIANA CIVIL PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
§ 6:98 (2016-2017 ed.).
103. See Marin, 48 So. 3d at 244.
104. Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan Oil,
No. 732-771, at 2-3.
105. Id. at 9.
106. Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan Oil,
No. 732-771, at 2-3.

2017]

COMMENT

253

2. Prescription of Legal Non-Conforming Uses
In the cases involving legal non-conforming uses, the harm for which
a plaintiff is suing is non-abidance by coastal use permitting laws. The
only guidance in the statute is that once a coastal use permit has been
issued, the user has two years to initiate a CUP.107 Further, the user has five
years from that issuance to complete the use.108 In general, interpretation of
prescriptive statutes should be construed in favor of maintaining the party’s
claim.109
In the Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits, the plaintiffs’ allegations in their
petitions are that the defendants failed to comply with state regulations,
but the defendants’ failure to comply is inevitably intertwined with harm
caused to the coastal zone.110 Damages are not a requirement for a valid
cause of action, yet all the parishes that are plaintiffs alleged them.111 For
those permits that were granted by OCM or a local permitting body, when
the user did not abide by the conditions of the permit, La. R.S. 49:214.36
does not specify a prescriptive period for a permitting body to bring an
action against a violator of that CUP.112 The prescriptive period for tort
claims may be relevant for violations of CUPs. For tort claims, the
prescriptive period commences on the day that the tortfeasor causes the
harm and runs for one year.113 In Chevron’s CUP file, under special permit
conditions, the application provides that the permit expires within two
years of the Secretary’s signature.114 At some point, the government’s
claim is stale, unless they are able to prove that the activity has continued
to cause harm each day since the expiration of the permit.
III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES:A NECESSARY STEP?
The 24th Judicial District Court in the Jefferson Parish case, in its
original adjudication, did not confront the question of whether the plaintiff
was required to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to bringing suit
107. LA. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 43, pt I, § 723(C)(9)(d) (2017).
108. Id.
109. See Marin, 48 So. 3d at 245.
110. See Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan
Oil, No. 732-771, at 14. “Defendants have failed to comply with numerous
provisions of the state coastal zone management program, as previously alleged,
and thus they are liable under the CZM Laws for any damages resulting from
these violations.”
111. See Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan
Oil, No. 732-771, at 14.
112. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36 (2014).
113. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3492 (2017).
114. See Coastal Use Permit 19831461, supra note 91.
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against the oil companies.115 Because the defendants filed an exception for
prematurity, the court did not have to decide whether there was a
requirement of exhaustion based on the merits of the suit.116 The district
court initially granted the exception.117 Exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a standing doctrine of administrative law, and a defendant may
plead in an exception for prematurity that the suit is not ready for judicial
determination because the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his or her
administrative remedies.118 In order for the defendant to be successful,
under Louisiana law, he or she must first show the availability of the
administrative remedy, and then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show
that the proper steps have been taken or that the remedy is inadequate.119
A. Space Occupied by the Doctrine
In Jefferson Parish v. Atlantic Richfield et. al., the defendants plead a
dilatory exception of prematurity for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. The effect of La. R.S. 49:214.36 is two-prong. The statute
creates a right and a cause of action for state and local governments to seek
judicial enforcement of violations of Louisiana CZM laws and sets out
enforcement steps for an administrative agency to take against violators of
the act.120 The exception of prematurity for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies claims that a judicial cause of action has not come into existence
because the plaintiff has not met a prerequisite condition before asserting
the claim.121 In its original disposition of the Jefferson Parish suit, the 24th
115. In its original reasons for judgment, the court in the 24th JDC found that
the local parish had not exhausted its administrative remedies against the oil
companies. See Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768. The
reversal of the original opinion also does not answer the question of whether
exhaustion of administrative remedies was necessary prior to filing suit.
116. See Defendant’s Exceptions for Prematurity, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
117. See Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768. In November,
the 24th JDC reversed its original decision. See Schleifstein, Jefferson Lawsuit,
supra note 15.
118. See FRANK L. MARAIST, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 6:6, n.27 (2d ed. 2008).
119. Id.
120. Parish of Plaquemines, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 890-91; See Boudreaux, supra
note 72, at 985-86.
121. Floyd v. East Bank Consol. Fire Protection Dist. for Parish of Jefferson,
40 So. 3d 160, 163 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (citing LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 926(A)(1)
(2010); Steeg v. Lawyers Tit. Ins. Corp., 329 So. 2d 719, 720 (La. 1976)). The
dilatory exception differs from a peremptory exception. The purpose of a
peremptory exception is to declare that the plaintiff’s action is legally nonexistent
or effectively barred by law. The peremptory exception tends to dismiss or defeat
the action. See Oakville Community v. Plaquemines Parish, 942 So. 2d 1152,
1155 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (citing LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 923 (2006)).
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Judicial District Court found that the Parish had not satisfied its burden of
proving that it was entitled to judicial relief under La. R.S. 49:21.36, because
it failed to show that “any administrative remedy [was] irreparably
inadequate,” and thus, required judicial enforcement.122 Although the district
court later reversed that decision, the court’s adjudication was not based on
availability of administrative remedies.123 If the court were to face the merits
of that issue, its central focus would be, first, if it is proper to address the
exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine and, second, whether there
is a prioritization of remedies under the statute so that the plaintiffs must
seek some remedies before others.
1. The Dilatory Exception for Prematurity
In the Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits, the defendant’s pleading of the
dilatory exception for prematurity is relevant to an inquiry of whether the
parishes’ suits are properly before the court. The judge must determine
whether the case is ready for adjudication. The exception is a tool for
parties to highlight the inadequacy of the suit for failure to take certain
administrative steps.124
The analysis begins with determining whether the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies can and should be applied to the
coastal use permitting process. In general, when courts are faced with an
issue involving an administrative agency, the court considers whether the
agency’s action was final and whether the person bringing suit has
exhausted his or her administrative remedies.125 In Louisiana, a defendant
pleading the dilatory exception of prematurity may do so in cases where the
pertinent law provides a procedure for the claimant to seek administrative
relief before seeking judicial review.126 In Steeg v. Lawyers Title Insurance
Corporation, competing insurance companies fought over the issue of
122. Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768. In its opinion, the
district court cited the requirement of consistency between state and local
divisions, the requirement for a field surveillance program, and the authority of
the permitting body to issue cease and desist orders as well as suspend, revoke, or
modify, coastal use permits.
123. Instead, the court reversed and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a new
trial. See BROWN & FERATT, supra note 18.
124. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Dilatory Exception of
Prematurity for Non-Compliance with La. Rev. Stat. § 42:263, Atlantic Richfield,
No. 732-768. In their memorandum, the defendants argued that the lawsuit should
be dismissed because the parish failed to obtain the Attorney General’s approval
as required by LA. REV. STAT. § 42:263.
125. See WILLIAM F. FUNK & RICHARD H. SEAMON, EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 261 (3d ed. 2009).
126. See CATHERINE PALO, LOUISIANA SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RELATED
TERMINATION MOTIONS § 2:97 (2016 ed.).
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prematurity for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.127 Similar to
the initial Jefferson Parish decision, the trial court found that the plaintiffs
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing suit.128
The Supreme Court in Steeg found that the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to show that all administrative remedies are irreparably inadequate. This
circumstance is exceptional.129 An administrative remedy is irreparably
inadequate when the harmful activity causes irreparable injury.130 The
Supreme Court in Steeg declined to adopt this argument and reserved the
right to determine administrative disputes for the administrative bodies
with original jurisdiction over such disputes.131 Yet, the Steeg case came
before the Supreme Court prior to the statewide implementation of the
CUP process. According to the Steeg Court’s reasoning, it was clear that
the legislature intended for administrative remedies to be exhausted in the
area of insurance law.132 Regulation through permitting is similar in that
there is a clear sense of public policy that supports the need for legislation.133
This notion of public policy translates to a strong administrative presence
for both OCM and the local permitting bodies.134 SLCRMA emphasizes
that the regulatory and administrative procedure should be the guiding
light, not judicial enforcement.135
2. Finding a Right of Action
By granting a right of action through La. R.S. 49:214.36 to certain
persons aggrieved by violations, the legislature made those who conduct
activity in the coastal zone susceptible to suit. Simply because the statutory
language grants the right does not necessarily mean that the cause of action
127. Steeg, 329 So.2d at 720.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing O’Meara v. Union Oil Co., 33 So. 2d 506, 510 (La. 1947)). In
the 24th Judicial District Court’s opinion, the court found that the plaintiff’s
assertion that the administrative remedy was inadequate because it did not provide
for an award of civil damages and not persuasive. The concern of whether issue
of damages may be addressed prior to administrative remedies is discussed infra.
130. Id. at 721 (“[J]udicial proceedings may sometimes be used when irreparable
injury might otherwise result.”).
131. Id. at 722.
132. Id.
133. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.22(2)(b) (2006). “The legislature declares that
it is the public policy of the state: . . . To express certain regulatory and nonregulatory policies for the coastal zone management program. Regulatory policies
are to form a basis for administrative decisions to approve or disapprove activities
only to the extent that such policies are contained in the statutes of this state or
regulations duly adopted and promulgated pursuant thereto.”
134. See Applying for a CUP, supra note 52.
135. Id.
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is always in existence. Determining at what point that right of action comes
into existence, triggering a cause of action, is vital in understanding
whether the suits will achieve any success.
A reading of the plain language of La. R.S. 49:214.36(D) leads to the
conclusion that state and local governments in Louisiana have a right of
action against persons who do not abide by CUP regulations.136 The statute
states:
The secretary, the attorney general, an appropriate district attorney,
or a local government with an approved program may bring such
injunctive, declaratory, or other actions as are necessary to ensure
that no uses are made of the coastal zone for which a coastal use
permit has not been issued when required or which are not in
accordance with the terms and conditions of a coastal use permit.137
The Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources and the Attorney
General are authorized to bring injunctive relief for both violations of a
coastal use permit and failure to obtain a coastal use permit when
needed.138 In addition, the Secretary of DNR and each parish with an
approved local program have the authority to conduct field surveillance,
issue cease and desist orders, and suspend, revoke, or modify permits.139
In La. R.S. 49:214.36, the provision authorizing suspension, revocation,
or modification of CUPs precedes the provision authorizing judicial
enforcement.140 The statute limits the judicial enforcement remedy to state
officers and local governments while excluding other entities or private
individuals. However, La. R.S. 49:214.36 expands the availability of an
action through breach of contract or in pursuit of other administrative
remedies.141 The court in the Jefferson Parish case concluded that it is the
136. In a decision over whether the federal district court had diversity
jurisdiction in Plaquemines Parish v. Total Petrochemical case, Judge Zainey
remanded to the state district court but, in dicta, suggested that the statute could be
reasonably interpreted as authorizing the Parish to file suit to enforce the Coastal
Zone Management laws in Louisiana. 64 F. Supp. 3d at 890. See also Boudreaux,
supra note 72, at 991.
137. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(D) (2014) (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. See also Boudreaux, supra note 72, at 985.
140. See LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36 (C), (D) (2014), respectively.
141. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(O)(4) (2014) states,
Nothing in this Section shall prevent or preclude any person or
any state or local governmental entity from enforcing
contractual rights or from pursuing any administrative remedy
otherwise authorized by law arising from or related to a state or
federal permit issued in the coastal area pursuant to R.S.
49:214.21 et seq., 33 U.S.C. §1344 or 33 U.S.C. §408.
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burden of the plaintiff to show that irreparable injury would result, and
thus administrative remedies are not sufficient.142 It is possible for the law
on exhaustion of administrative remedies to be laid out more clearly.143
B. Availability of Remedies
If the district courts are confronted with the issue of availability of
administrative remedies for state and local governments, the first source
to consider is enabling legislation, followed by the Administrative Code.
Administrative agencies, such as DNR, may only operate based on the
powers they have been delegated through statute.144
1. Suspending Action
La. R.S. 214.36(C) enables the permitting body to suspend a permit
for a permittee.145 The Administrative Code specifies the procedure for
suspending a permit.146 A permitting body may suspend a permit if one of
three requirements is satisfied: the permittee has failed to comply with the
terms and conditions or modifications of the permit; the permittee has
submitted false or incomplete information with the permit; or the permittee
has failed or refused to comply with a lawful order or request on behalf of
the permitting body.147 The Jefferson Parish petition did not specify
whether these actions were taken in response to the alleged violating
activities. Rather, the plaintiffs’ main contention is that, even if remedies
exist, all remedies are irreparably inadequate.148
La. R.S. 49:214.36 does not specify whether the uses for which a state
or local entity is allowed to bring suit must be either a state or local use.
Under the language of La. R.S. 49:214.36, it is unclear whether the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies equally to state
and local permitting bodies.149 If the doctrine does not apply equally, then
142. See Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
143. For example, see McAlister v. County of Monterey, 147 Cal. App. 4th
253, 274 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“Under the doctrine of administrative exhaustion,
the long-standing general rule is this: ‘where an adequate administrative remedy
is provided by statute, resort to that forum is a ‘jurisdictional’ prerequisite to
judicial consideration of the claim.’”).
144. PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 33 (11th ed. 2011).
145. See LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(C) (2014).
146. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(D)(2) (2017).
147. Id.
148. See Parish of Jefferson’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s
Exception of No Right of Action, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
149. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(D) (2014) states,
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the parishes may not have to prove that administrative remedies are
required to be exhausted prior to bringing suit.150 Read in tandem with the
rest of the statute, the distinction of state and local uses should not operate
to prevent state or local governments from bringing a cause of action.151
2. Considering Prior Violations
In Louisiana, courts have held government agencies responsible for
failing to enforce applicable laws and regulations. In Oakville Community
v. Plaquemines Parish, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s decision, which granted the defendant’s exception of no cause
of action.152 Plaquemines Parish Council, as the local permitting body for
CUPs, had granted a permit to Industrial Pipe, Inc.153 The Oakville
Community Group sued the Council based on allegations that the Council
had failed to comply with the regulatory requirements under the Louisiana
Administrative Code.154 Specifically, the group claimed that the Council
did not comply with the statutory requirements for the approval of a CUP
for the proposed landfill expansion.155 By holding that the Oakville group
had a right of action, the Fourth Circuit affirmed that the action by the
group should stay within the court system.156
The Oakville case illustrates the lack of consideration that prior
violations are given to new proposed activities. In 1985, the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) issued an order assessing
a penalty against the sole proprietor of Industrial Pipe, Inc. for operating
an illegal solid waste dump.157 After issuing the order, DEQ managed the

The secretary, the attorney general, an appropriate district
attorney, or a local government with an approved program may
bring such injunctive, declaratory, or other actions as are
necessary to ensure that no uses are made of the coastal zone for
which a coastal use permit has not been issued when required or
which are not in accordance with the terms and conditions of a
coastal use permit. (emphasis added).
150. See Parish of Plaquemines, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 892.
151. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.25(B) (2014) states, “[T]he delineation of uses
of state or local concern shall not be construed to prevent the state or local
governments from otherwise regulating or issuing permits for either class of use
pursuant to another law.”
152. See Oakville Community, 942 So. 2d at 1157.
153. Id. at 1154.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1158.
157. Corinne Van Dalen, Oakville–Unprotected: A Study in Environmental
Injustice, 58 LOY. L. REV. 391, n.2 (2012).
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proceedings.158 DEQ was involved because the original use by Industrial
Pipe was a land use. Therefore, the company was required to seek a CUP
because they sought to expand their activities into the wetlands.159 In 2003,
Industrial Pipe was able to obtain a CUP without significant consideration
of the permittee’s prior violation of land use laws.160 If those oil companies
who are held liable in the Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits have committed
past violations on land or in water, and the government then approved the
permit, then the permitting body should also be held responsible for not
properly regulating the permittee’s use when there is evidence of not
following guidelines.
SLCRMA mandates that “no use” may be conducted without proper
permitting.161 Jefferson Parish’s claims are largely based on uses of state
concern.162 Judicial interpretation has indicated that the language in the
statute is not express in authorizing joint parish and state action in civil
litigation. The issue is inconsequential because the parishes are authorized
to bring suit on behalf of the state.163 However, the parishes do not have
jurisdiction over state uses pertaining to administrative remedies and may
only issue cease and desist orders as it relates to a local use.164 If this is the
only administrative remedy available to local permitting bodies when
regulating state uses, then the local government may have no other option
besides bringing suit against the defendant oil company. There are
conflicting directions within the statute: the parishes are allowed to bring
suit on behalf of the state but are not allowed to take the administrative
steps when it comes to the same allegations of harm.
The Administrative Code provides further rules that coastal users must
read alongside the Coastal Zone regulations. A permitting body may seek
civil and criminal relief if the permittee does not comply with a cease and
desist order or a suspension.165 One reading of this provision suggests that
158. Id. LDEQ set up a plan with Industrial Pipe, authorizing it to continue the
activities to an extent and subsequently issued compliance orders after finding
further violations.
159. Id. at 393.
160. Id. at 394.
161. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(D) (2014).
162. See Petition for Damages to the Jefferson Parish Coastal Zone, Canlan
Oil, No. 732-771.
163. See Parish of Plaquemines, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 892. “Section 49:214.36(D)
does lack the more express ‘state’ language found in the statutes at issue in
Louisiana v. Union Oil and Williams, supra, much less an explicit authorization
for a parish to join the State of Louisiana as an active party-plaintiff in civil
litigation.”
164. Id. “Section 49:214.36(B) expressly limits a local government’s authority
to issue cease and desist order to permits pertaining to local uses.”
165. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(D)(4) states, “If the permittee fails
to comply with a cease and desist order or the suspension or revocation of a
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the permitting body must first issue a cease and desist order or take steps
to suspend or revoke a coastal use permit prior to filing suit and seeking a
judicial remedy. Judge Zainey, in Parish of Plaquemines v. Total
Petrochemical, read the provision expansively, applying a broad lens to
the Act–the regulatory provision did not limit the local governments to
taking certain steps before others.166 However, this is not the interpretation
that was followed by the 24th Judicial District Court in the Jefferson
Parish case, where the court found that, despite the multitude of
administrative remedies available to the permitting body, it was the local
government’s burden to prove that judicial action was necessary.167
Instead, the provision should be read narrowly in connection with La. R.S.
49:214.36(B) to only issue cease and desist orders for local uses.168 If this
is the case, then cease and desist orders were not an available remedy to
Jefferson Parish or any of the other parishes. According to La. R.S.
49:214.36, a penalty or cost may not be assessed against a violator without
the opportunity for an adjudicatory hearing.169 In other areas of coastal use
permitting law, when a permittee does not abide by the procedural
guidelines of a coastal use permit, the permit is vacated.170 However, this
does not cover circumstances where there was no permit issued in the first
place.
3. Modifying Priorities
According to the 24th Judicial District Court, one of the available
alternatives to the permitting body is to allow modification of coastal use
permits.171 Prior to issuing a cease and desist order, or suspending or revoking
a permit, the permittee is allowed to modify the permit.172 However, the
process of modification is one that the permittee must initiate, and the
permittee must agree to the modifications with the permitting body, which
may either be the state’s Department of Natural Resources or the approved

permit, the permitting body shall seek appropriate civil and criminal relief as
provided by §214.34 of the SLCRMA.”
166. See Parish of Plaquemines, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 892. (“[T]he Parish’s
damage claims are not limited to permitted uses to which §723(D)(4) of the
Administrative Code pertains.”).
167. Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
168. Id.
169. See LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(L) (2014).
170. See Industrial Pipe, Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish Council, 139 So. 3d 1168,
1169 (La. Ct. App. 2014).
171. Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
172. LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(D)(1)(a) (2017).
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local permitting program.173 Thus, the issuance of a modified permit
hinges on the mutual agreement of the two parties: the permitting authority
and the permittee. To determine whether a modification of a permit, based
on a changing use, or an application for a new permit is required, the DNR
must determine whether the proposed activity will significantly increase
the impacts of a permitted activity.174 In Pardue v. Gomez, the First Circuit
considered whether the plaintiff was required to apply for a new coastal
use permit or could modify his existing permit.175 The First Circuit
departed from the plain meaning of the Administrative Code’s regulations,
finding that if the permitting body determined that the proposed activity
would cause significant impacts, the only requirement was sending the
permittee’s application for a modified permit out for public notice.176
Interpreting the modification provisions in light of their placement in
the regulations, allowing permittees to modify their permits after the fact,
is not an available remedy to, nor a remedy readily enforced by, the
permitting bodies that observe non-compliant behavior.177 Further, even if
the permitting body was allowed to initiate modifications, a determination
is required that the use will “significantly increase” the impacts of a
permitted activity.178 This is the same standard that must be applied to
determine if a use should be permitted.179 The criteria that must be met in
order to determine whether the use requires a permit are best addressed by
an administrative body familiar with the impact and background of the
area, rather than a judicial body designated to rule on matters of law. The
Louisiana Supreme Court, in Pardue v. Gomez, found that this is a
consideration that requires analysis of social and economic, as well as

173. See LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(D)(1)(b) (2017); see also LA.
ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(C)(1) (2017), which discusses general
requirements for permit applications.
174. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, §723(D)(1)(a) (2017).
175. Pardue v. Gomez, 597 So. 2d 567 (La. Ct. App. 1992). The plaintiff
wanted to build a boat launch, which was not covered by his prior permit. In the
communications with DNR, Pardue could not “properly proceed by way of an
application for a modification of an existing permit.” Supra p. 569.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 571. “After careful consideration of the record adduced in the case
at bar, this Court hereby finds that the Department did, in fact, act arbitrarily and
capriciously in denying the modification requested.” Supra p. 570.
178. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, §723(D)(1)(a) (2017).
179. LA. ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note 43, at 48. The statement
cites three criteria that must be considered. These are that, “significant public
benefits will result from the use,” “the use would serve important regional, state
or national interests, including the national interest in resources and the siting of
the facilities in the coastal zone identified in the coastal resources program,” or
“the use is coastal water dependent.”
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environmental impacts.180 If the use will cause such a change, then the
permitting body is directed to process the permit as a new application for
a permit, rather than a modification.181 Those companies which failed to
obtain a permit when one was required will not be able to argue that
modification was available to the administrative bodies, since it must be
first sought by the permittee.
It is unclear whether the “permitting body” referred to in the
Administrative Code includes both state and local permitting bodies, since
they are given such authority under La. R.S. 49:214.36,182 or whether it
only refers to state governments. The 24th Judicial District Court found
that the “permitting body” language referred to the DNR because the
Secretary of the DNR is the only authority authorized under the Code to
determine whether a coastal use permit is required.183 Depending on which
body is responsible for the issuing the permit, either the state or local
agency, in a claim brought under La. R.S. 49:214.36(D), the necessary
administrative will vary.
The lack of a distinction in La. R.S. 49:214.21-36 between state and
local permitting authorities creates confusion over which body has
primary authority in enforcement and is an anomaly in other coastal states
which have coastal zone management programs.184 As a comparison,
California’s Coastal Act, creates a space for local governments to regulate
activities within their jurisdictions through their own proposed local
coastal plan or one that the Coastal Commission prepares.185 Once the local
plan is in place, the Coastal Act delegates the authority to the local
government to issue coastal development permits.186 Further, Washington’s
Shoreline Management Program mandates that local governments must
adopt shoreline master programs (“SMP”) overseen and reviewed by the
Department of Ecology.187 This Program was used by the local counties,
particularly in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. King County.188 The County brought
suit for declaratory judgment, injunction, damages, and other relief because
180. See 597 So.2d at 572.
181. Id.
182. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(D) (2014).
183. Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
184. See EAGLE & CALDWELL, supra note 1, at 369 (“Local governments…
are often primary implementers of state coastal policies and programs.”).
185. WANT, supra note 47, at § 13:5 (referencing Act. Cal. Pub. Res. Code
§30500, “Each local government lying, in whole or in part, within the coastal zone
shall prepare a coastal program for that portion of the coastal zone within its
jurisdiction
[A]ny local government may request, in writing, the commission
to prepare a local coastal program, or a portion thereof, for the local government.”).
186. Id.
187. Id. at § 13:35.
188. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. King County, 91 Wash. 2d 721 (Wash. 1979).
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the developer had not applied for a substantial development permit prior to
commencing construction.189 The Court found that the local county
governments in Washington have the authority to enforce the regulations
under the Shoreline Management Act (“SMA”).190 The SMA makes explicit
that local county governments may not bring injunctive, declaratory, or
other actions for enforcement, unless they attempt to engage the DNR in the
process first.191 This requirement that the local parishes first turn to the state’s
Department of Natural Resources before seeking judicial enforcement of
violations of coastal use permits is not in La. R.S. 49:214.36.
C. Accessibility of Damages
The administrative process plays an important role in the assessment of
civil damages.192 This notion implies that the civil damages are triggered by
the administrative process, in that the process is what determines the amount
and breadth of damages. Without an adequate assessment of damages by the
respective administrative agencies, the penalty may be solely in the court’s
discretion.
The language in La. R.S. 49:214.36 is unclear on the appropriate steps
for administrative remedies, but the availability of damages within the statute
might provide some guidance. The 2014 revision of La. R.S. 49:214.36(O)
states that damages received from enforcement of a violation of a CUP must
be directed towards coastal protection, restoration, and the overall
improvement of the coastal area.193 This model is not representative of what

189. Id. at 724.
190. Id. at 732.
191. See REV. CODE OF WASHINGTON ANN. § 76.09.140(3) (2017):
Injunctions, declaratory actions, or other actions for enforcement
under this subsection may not be commenced unless the
department fails to take appropriate action after ten days written
notice to the department by the county of a violation of the forest
practices rule or final orders of the department or appeals board.
192. See Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
193. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(O) (2014):
Any monies received by a state or local governmental entity
arising from or related to a state or federal permit issued pursuant
to R.S. 49:214.21 . . . a violation thereof, or enforcement thereof,
or for damages or other relief arising from or related to any of
the foregoing, or for damages or other relief arising from or
related to any use as defined by R.S. 49:214.23(13) shall be
used for integrated coastal protection, including coastal
restoration, hurricane protection, and improving the resiliency
of the coastal area.
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is common in “public law litigation,”194 from the last century into the
present, where there has been a disconnect between the right that is
asserted by the plaintiff and the remedies that are afforded.195 By requiring
that the damages that are received from a lawsuit under La. R.S. 49:214.36
must flow to areas of coastal protection, SLCRMA unifies the right of
action that is being asserted by state governments with the purpose behind
the law. Thus, if the available remedy that is given goes towards coastal
restoration, then the enforcement mechanisms should be clear so that the
remedies can properly be allocated.
The revised version of subsection (O) lists a multitude of sources that
could activate the “monies” or the damages provision.196 The money
damages may arise from a violation or enforcement.197 Damages may also
arise for any other damages or relief arising from “the foregoing.”198 The
language in the revision is extremely broad and gives ample room to the
courts for interpretation. The 24th Judicial District Court interpreted the
provision exclusively, finding that without involvement in the administrative
process, the amount of damages cannot be determined.199 This suggests a
judicial reluctance to get involved in determinations of damages by
administrative bodies. Considering this judicial reluctance and the multiplicity
of administrative remedies, it is clear that permitting bodies should turn to
those remedies prior to turning to the courts.
IV. ZONING THE COAST AND STREAMLINING A SOLUTION
For those lawsuits that are currently pending, a change in the language
of the statute will not have a retroactive effect. A proposal for an end to
the unequal application must occur within the legal framework that already
194. Public law litigation consists of lawsuits which fight for significant social
values that affect most of society. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, n.1 (1989).
195. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1293-94 (1976) provides:
The form of relief does not flow ineluctably from the liability
determination, but is fashioned ad hoc. In the process, moreover,
right and remedy have been to some extent transmuted. The
liability determination is not simply a pronouncement of the legal
consequences of past events, but to some extent a prediction of
what is likely to be in the future. And relief is not a terminal,
compensatory transfer, but an effort to devise a program to
contain future consequences in a way that accommodates the
range of interests involved.
196. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.46(O) (2014).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Reasons for Judgment, Atlantic Richfield, No. 732-768.
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exists while addressing the ongoing concerns through the lawsuit. This will
include making other remedies more readily available to the permitting
bodies and state and local agencies. The purpose of the CZMA was never to
induce tort-like lawsuits, but to encourage care and regulation of the coast.
Any solution for how the CZMA should be implemented should be guided
by that principle.
A. Allowing for Judicial Discretion
The local parishes’ claims that the oil companies have violated
SLCRMA and the Administrative Code are not currently enforceable due
to the availability of other administrative remedies.200 Louisiana’s statute
is not clear concerning which actions must come first: must parishes first
suspend, revoke, or modify a permit, or can they take civil action before
instituting any of those actions?201 This issue is intensified in most states,
not just Louisiana, because courts are unwilling to impute knowledge of a
violation or a duty onto the state and local permitting agencies to check
for compliance with issued permits.202 However, some states are more
effective at dealing with this problem through statutory clarity. For
example, North Carolina’s coastal law ties administrative remedies and
judicial enforcement into one provision and allows for judicial discretion
in determining the remedies afforded to the plaintiff.203 According to
North Carolina’s statute, both the State agency and local government’s
rights of action are triggered upon a violation of the provisions of the
coastal management law, and the statute clarifies that the government may
institute the action before or after a proceeding for the collection of a
penalty has been instituted.204 Thus, when a person has failed to comply
with the requirements under the North Carolina law, he or she may file an
action seeking relief.205
200. See supra, Part I.C.
201. See discussion supra, Part III.B.
202. In Feduniak v. California Coastal Commission, the California court found
that there was no statutory duty on behalf of the Coastal Commission to review
decisions by local permitting agencies nor were they willing to impute knowledge
to the Commission of the status of all properties for which permits were issued.
148 Cal. App. 4th 1346, 1365-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). The California courts have
found that neither a statutory duty nor an administrative duty exists to check for
compliance. Supra p. 1363.
203. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 113A-126(a)-(b).
204. Id.
205. In the case of State ex. rel. Rhodes v. Gaskill, the State filed a complaint
and motion for preliminary injunction in order to restrain the defendant from
violating the Coastal Area Management Act of 1974 and the Dredge and Fill Act
and to require restoration of the property. Although the court eventually dismissed
the case, it was due to the fact that the parties had reached a consent judgment
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The available remedies to state and local permitting bodies are
suspension, revocation, and modification of a permit.206 By incorporating
a duty into the Administrative Code for OCM to supervise the permitting
decisions emitted by local permitting bodies, there would be a dual
responsibility both on behalf of the state to enforce its permitting
regulations, through cease and desist orders, or by filing notice of potential
suspension, prior to filing suit. Likewise, permittees would be encouraged
to stay updated on their permit conditions, particularly as to whether or not
they are meeting the established conditions of their permits. In the
Terrebonne Parish School Board case, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that there was no implied duty on the behalf of a lessor to restore the land
when the agreement did not expressly provide for such a provision.207
However, the CUPs expressly provide for the conditions that a user must
abide by in order to be in compliance.208 By enforcing these provisions,
OCM and the local permitting bodies will hold the coastal users more
accountable prior to turning to judicial remedies.
Enforcement remedies in the Administrative Code should be expanded
to account for specific steps taken by local permitting bodies in order to
provide additional guidance to administrative bodies. The Administrative
Code is limited to one enforcement provision.209 By increasing such
provisions, there will be a clear procedure for a state or local government to
follow. This will lead to greater accountability for the permittee and provide
proof to the courts that the permitting body has exhausted all administrative
remedies prior to seeking a judicial remedy. Other states have attempted to
achieve this transparency and have often succeeded. For example, the
California Code of Regulations requires a methodology for identifying
issues that must be implemented by the local coastal programs that exist in
the state.210 The purpose of the methodology required under the California
Code is to identify existing or potential conflicts in the Coastal Zone.211
From the local program’s inception, there is a designated purpose and
incentive towards achieving the overarching public policy of the state. In
analyzing that provision, the Appellate Court in California noted in Yost
v. Thomas that the role of the state and local governing bodies is to carry
out the administrative functions that are meant to achieve the public policy
during the pending period which rendered the issue before the court moot. 383
S.E.2d 923 (N.C. 1989).
206. LA. REV. STAT. § 49:214.36(C) (2014).
207. Terrebonne Parish School Bd., 893 So. 2d at 802.
208. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(C)(9) (2017).
209. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(D)(4) (2017).
210. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 13503 (2017).
211. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 13503(a) (2017).
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of the state.212 By designating the power to enact enforcement provisions
to the respective local permitting bodies, those administrative agencies are
able to control their permitting processes while remaining within the
framework of the Coastal Management Act’s overarching objectives and
policies.
B. Streamlining the Cause of Action
To align the stated goals and remedies of SLCRMA, the power to file
suit for violations should be reserved to the designated government
official, while allowing for the opportunity to funnel the benefits of
enforcement down to the local level. The California Code of Regulations
exclusively allows the executive director of the Coastal Commission to
bring a direct action against a violator under its enforcement provisions
for the California Coastal Act.213 Louisiana should streamline its
authorization to bring suit, specifically against violators of the coastal use
permits, into the office of the secretary of DNR. Public and private persons
and the state and local governments should still be able to bring suit based
on breach of contract provisions, and other administrative remedies should
remain available. The body of law surrounding coastal regulation is
complex, and the authority to bring suit for violations of coastal use permits
should be delegated to one office. The secretary of DNR is emphatically
involved in the permitting process and must ensure consistency between the
purpose of the state’s coastal management program and implementation.214
The Coastal Commission has jurisdiction over appeals of coastal use permit
decisions, followed by the Attorney General.215 The Coastal Commission
should implement this priority of enforcement by becoming the body to
first hear all issues concerning violations of coastal use permits.
Similarly, California has put in place a mechanism for appeal from the
local governments to the Coastal Commission based on certain provisions.216
An appeals court in California faced this issue in North Pacifica, LLC. v.
212. See Yost v. Thomas, 189 Cal. Rptr. 549, 556 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
213. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 13173 (2017):
Whenever the executive director of the commission determines
that any violation of the provisions of the California Coastal Act
of 1976 has occurred or is threatened, the Attorney General may
file an action in the name of the commission for equitable relief
to enjoin such violation, or for civil penalties, or both, or may
take other appropriate action pursuant to Chapter 9 of the
California Coastal Act of 1976.
214. See Boudreaux, supra note 72, at 985.
215. For an example, see Letter from Attorney General William J. Guste to
Brenda McClure (Feb. 21, 1980) (on file with author).
216. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30603 (West 2017).
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California Coastal Commission, where the local city government refused to
seek review, through appeal, by the state’s coastal commission, claiming that
it was not required under the statute.217 Because the appeals court had
previously held that the plaintiff needed to exhaust its administrative
hearings, it held similarly in this case that the administrative process,
through the Coastal Commission, should be prioritized before judicial
review.218
Fields of zoning regulation and coastal use permitting regulation are
subject to parallel frameworks of analysis.219 Zoning laws operate under
similar mechanisms and rationale as coastal management laws.220 The
Louisiana zoning laws explicitly designate that local authorities may bring
an action when a building or structure is in violation of the laws, but those
authorities may also turn to other remedies.221 The Supreme Court of
Louisiana upheld that local authority to file suit in City of New Orleans v.
Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District.222 The purpose of
zoning laws is to promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare
of the community.223 Similarly, in the case of coastal use law, the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be applied in the zoning
context.224 By officially incorporating zoning’s application into the coastal
use context, these issues may be solved.
In contrast to the coastal permitting regulations, changes, which
significantly increase the impacts of a permitted activity, under zoning
regulations, are processed as a new application, rather than a modification.225
Altering the Administrative Code to process all new uses with significant
impact on the coastal zone will force the permitting body to objectively
217. See North Pacifica, LLC. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 2008 WL 741314
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
218. Id. at 5.
219. See Van Dalen, supra note 157, at 392-94.
220. The transition between land use regulation and coastal management
regulation was demonstrated in the case of Oakville Community v. Plaquemines
Parish. That case illustrated a breakdown of the system as failure to abide by land
use guidelines that did not affect the Council’s later decision to issue a coastal use
permit by the same user. 942 So. 2d 1152.
221. LA. REV. STAT. § 33:4728 (2017), “In case any building or structure is
erected, structurally altered, or maintained, or any building, structure or land is
used in violation of R.S. 33:4721 through R.S. 33:4729 . . . the proper local
authorities of the municipality, in addition to other remedies, may institute any
appropriate action or proceedings ”
222. See City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Commissioners of Orleans Levee Dist,
640 So. 2d 237, 246 (La. 1994).
223. See Phillips’ Bar & Restaurant, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 116 So. 3d
92, 101 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
224. See State ex. rel. Bert Leasing Corp. v. Donelon, 173 So. 2d 24, 26 (La.
Ct. App. 1965).
225. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. I, § 723(D)(1)(a) (2017).
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analyze the permittee’s past record. This will be more efficient than
requiring an agreement between the parties.226 Additionally, this would
eliminate the confusion about whether a new use will have such an impact
that it would require a new application. Instead, the Office of Coastal
Management will process all new activities as a new application. Further,
zoning regulation enforcements are subject to a five-year prescription.227
C. Incorporating the Deference Doctrine
An administrative agency’s interpretation of whether a use is
permissible and additionally, whether a defendant violated those uses
should be the foremost consideration in a decision involving regulatory
structures.228 Louisiana courts have not adopted this deference doctrine
explicitly in the limited number of rulings on coastal use permits. Yet,
based on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the
Supreme Court in Steeg found that deference should be given to
administrative bodies when looking at regulations.229 The Supreme Court
has also echoed that it is unwilling to submerge itself in the restoration of
the coast, primarily through damages from litigation disputes, and prefers
to leave that role to the state agencies and experts.230 This may be applied
at the level of the judiciary but also should be incorporated through
language into the statute.
SLCRMA and the Administrative Code place the obligation on the
person conducting activity within the coastal zone to seek proper
permitting. When interpreting these laws based on legislative intent, it
appears the legislature allocated the burden of conforming to the coastal
use guidelines to those seeking to utilize the coastal zone to their benefit.
However, the legislature also purposely created an administrative agency,
and subsequently an entire administrative body of law, to implement these
rules. The permittee has a duty to apply for a permit and ensure compliance,
while the permitting bodies have a duty to enforce and regulate the permits.
It is clear when a permittee violates SLCRMA by either failing to
obtain or not abiding by permit conditions. However, the amount of
226. Disagreement over permitting decisions and the consequences were
prevalent in Pardue v. Gomez. See Pardue, 597 So. 2d 567.
227. See 116 So. 3d at 101-102.
228. See Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control,
411 S.C. 16, 33 (S.C. 2014).
229. See Steeg, 329 So. 2d 719.
230. See Terrebonne Parish School Bd., 893 So. 2d at 802. “The court is
hesitant to interpose its authority, limited, as it must be, to resolving civil disputes
between litigating parties, to order piecemeal restoration of the coast in some
fashion, considering the far superior knowledge of relevant environmental
concerns that state agencies and experts possess.”
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damages or penalties that should be assessed is not so clear, which may
explain the local permitting bodies’ quick turn to damages in the Parish
Coastal Zone lawsuits. By solidifying the deference doctrine, whereby the
courts make it clear that the determination of damages by the
administrative body is the first and foremost consideration, the issue of
damages will be resolved. Subsection (O) of SLCRMA should require
administrative input prior to an assessment of monies owed. The statutory
language requiring that all damages arising from the foregoing should be
eliminated, and language that requires an administrative determination of
damages, prior to filing suit, should be substituted in its place.231 Finally,
following the inclusion of that provision, the statute should read that
judicial remedies will only be available upon a certification by the agency
that there is a violation and that damages have and may be assessed. It
should be the role of the courts to enforce that finding.
CONCLUSION
The tension between development and preservation of the environment
is palpable in Louisiana, particularly in the Parish Coastal Zone Lawsuits.232
SLCRMA is not clear as to the proper steps that a person harmed under the
statute should take in order to obtain a sufficient remedy. The variety of
administrative remedies that are available under the statute does not
specify which should be primarily available, and because the right to bring
an action exists for public and private persons, the courts have a wide
breadth of interpretation.233 The consequence is that courts may dismiss suits
with legitimate concerns at stake, and those who wish to seek enforcement are
left without guidance. By revising SLCRMA and streamlining the language
of the statute, issues of ambiguity will be resolved.
Under a revised CZMA in Louisiana, there should be explicit judicial
discretion only when a plaintiff has exhausted its remedies with the
administrative body. By deferring to the permitting body for issues of
damages and enforcement against the coastal user, the court places primary
authority to the body responsible for issuing permits in the first place.
Further, the body that has the authority under the act to bring a cause of
231. For example, the statute could read, “. . . or for damages or other relief
arising from a determination by the Department of Natural Resources or a local
permitting body, on appeal to the Coastal Commission, of such damages.”
232. The stated goal of the Office of Coastal Management is to balance
conservation and development. See Applying for a CUP, supra note 52.
233. This is evidenced by the 24th JDC’s recent reversal of their opinion in the
Jefferson Parish case. In November, the court found that the parish was not required
to exhaust its administrative remedies. See Schleifstein, Jefferson Lawsuit, supra
note 15.
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action for violations of the CUP process should be DNR. Local coastal
zone management programs will continue to exist but should appeal to the
Coastal Commission as an aggrieved party under the statute. Thus, the fate
of the coast may not lay in political mongering but will be guided by
statutory authority.
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